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Abstract— Internet of Things (IoT) become discretionary 
part of everyday life and could befall a threat if security 
is not considered before deployment. Authentication and 
access control in IoT is equally important to establish 
secure communication between devices. To protect IoT 
from man in middle, replay and denial of service attacks, 
the concept of capability for access control is introduced. 
This paper presents Identity establishment and 
capability based access control (IECAC) protocol using 
ECC (Elliptical Curve Cryptography) for IoT along with 
protocol evaluation, which protect against the 
aforementioned attacks. The protocol evaluation by 
using security protocol verification tool shows that 
IECAC is secure against these attacks. This paper also 
discusses performance analysis of the protocol in terms 
of computational time and compared with other existing 
solutions.  
Keywords-Access Control ; Capability ; Identity 
Establishment  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
IoT is mandatory subset of future Internet where every 
virtual or physical thing can communicate with every other 
thing giving seamless service to all stakeholders. IoT is 
convergence of resource constrained sensors, RFID, smart 
devices and anything with sensing, computing and 
communication capability and the realistic notion of IoT [1] 
has been seen with the development of wireless 
communication and Internet access between these devices. 
Seamless communication between ubiquitous things in IoT 
possesses problems of authentication and access control. 
The greater scale and scope of IoT increases the options in 
which a user can interact with the things in his/her physical 
and virtual environment. IoT could be both distributed and 
ad-hoc in nature and therefore security problem are 
daunting. In multi-hop network, each node acts as a receiver 
and transmitter; attacker can gain access to resources and 
devices in the absence of authentication mechanism.  
Dynamic network topology due to mobile nodes, lower 
bandwidth than traditional network and energy constraints 
are another threats to IoT networks causing attacks like 
denial of service attack. Notion of identity establishment 
and authentication are closely related to each other. Identity 
establishment is process of associating user with another 
legitimate user or resource. Authentication is secure 
identification of entities in which proof of possession of an 
identity is verified. Devices ranging from sensors to RFID 
tags, identities extended to heterogeneous devices are the 
main challenges of IoT to devices, ubiquitous interaction 
and large numbers of design security solutions.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section II evaluates and 
summarizes related work in the authentication in IoT. 
Section III presents proposed protocol for mutual identity 
establishment and access control. Section IV presents 
security analysis of different attacks and protocol 
verification. Section V presents protocol evaluation in terms 
of computational time and comparison with the other 
existing solutions. Section VI concludes the paper with 
future plans.  
II. RELATED WORK  
There is closely related work done in [2] where security 
association takes place with increased communication 
overhead and authentication is left unaddressed. Authors 
presented distributed access control solution based on 
security profiles but attack resistance is not explored. In [3], 
authors have presented ECC based authentication protocol 
but the major disadvantage is that they are not Denial of 
Service (DoS) attack resistant, which is of paramount 
important in IoT that consists of billions of devices. In [4], 
author addresses the problem of secure communication and 
authentication based on shared key and is applicable to 
limited location and cannot be used for wide area. It 
addresses the peer-to-peer authentication but cannot be 
extended in resource constrained environment. There has 
been lot of debate about which of the cryptographic 
primitives like PKI or symmetric crypto is suitable for the 
IoT.  Most of the research has mainly focused in the area 
like Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) and its application. 
Many security mechanisms have been proposed based on 
the private key cryptographic primitives due to fast 
computation and energy efficiency. Scalability problem and 
memory requirement to store keys makes it inefficient to 
heterogeneous devices in IoT. Public key cryptography 
based solution overcomes these challenges with high 
scalability, low memory requirements and no requirement of 
key pre-distribution infrastructure. In [5], authors have 
presented ECC based mutual authentication protocol for IoT 
using hash functions. Mutual authentication is achieved 
between terminal node and platform using secret key 
cryptosystem introducing the problem of key management 
and storage. Self- certified keys cryptosystem based 
distributed user authentication scheme for WSN is presented 
in [6] where only user nodes are authenticated and is not 
lightweight solution for IoT. In [7], author presents 
authentication with Parameter passing during handshake.
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TABLE 1. STATE OF THE ART EVALUATION SUMMARY 
Solutions 
Parameters 
Mutual 
Authentication 
Lightweight 
Solution 
Attack Resistant Distributed 
Nature 
Access 
Control DoS Man in Middle Replay 
[2] No No No No No Yes Yes 
[3] Yes Yes No No No Yes No 
[4] No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
[5] Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
[6] No No No No No Yes No 
[7] Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 
[8] Yes No No No No Yes No 
[9] Yes No No No No Yes No 
[2]: Ubiquitous access control in MAGNET , [3]: ECC based authentication in RIFID , [4]: Authentication Ad-hoc wireless network , [5]: Authentication in IoT , [6]: Authentication in WSN , [7]: Progressive 
authentication in Ad-hoc Network , [8]: Peer identification and authentication ,   [9]: Authentication in Ad-hoc network 
Handshake process is time consuming and also based on 
symmetric key cryptography that consumes more memory 
for large prime numbers. Efficient identification and 
authentication presented in [8] and is based on the signal 
properties of node but is not suited for mobile nodes. 
Direction of the signal is considered as parameter for node 
authentication but it takes more time to decide signal 
direction with more memory and computations involved. In 
[9], cluster based authentication is proposed which is most 
suited for futuristic IoT, but attacker can get hold of 
distribution of system key pairs and cluster key. Generation 
of random numbers and signatures creates considerable 
computational overhead consuming memory resources. 
State of the art evaluation is shown in Table 1. Related work 
is summarized based on the parameters like mutual 
authentication, lightweight solution, resistant to attacks, 
distributed nature and access control solution. From table 1, 
it is clear that, all existing solutions for authentication and 
access control do not fulfill all requirements for IoT.  
Objective is to achieve mutual identity establishment i.e. 
authentication and once authenticated, access control will 
take place. Paper proposes new method of authentication of 
devices and access control for the IoT using public key 
approach with scalability and less memory requirements. 
Most important design issue of IoT is the mobility of 
heterogeneous devices and our scheme works efficiently for 
this need. 
III. PROPOSED  IECAC SCHEME  IN IOT 
Algorithm presented in this paper addresses both 
authentication and access control which are divided into 
three parts: 
A. Secret key generation based on Elliptical Curve 
Cryptography-Diffie Hellman algorithm (ECCDH)  
B. Identity Establishment  
C. Capability creation for access control 
A. Secret key generation based on ECCDH and identity 
establishment for  authentication 
There is considerable interest in ECC for IoT security 
[10].It has advantages of small key size and low computation 
overhead. It uses public key cryptography approach based on 
elliptic curve on finite fields. ECCDH [10] is a symmetric 
key agreement protocol that allows two devices that have no 
prior knowledge about each other to establish a shared secret 
key which can be used in any security algorithm. Using this 
public parameter and own private parameter, these parties 
can calculate the shared secret. Any third party, who doesn't 
have access to the private details of each device, cannot 
calculate the shared secret from available public information.  
All devices joining IoT shares key pair during the 
bootstrapping. IECAC scheme presented in this paper is also 
applicable to security bootstrapping. Security bootstrapping 
is the process by which devices join the IoT with respect to 
location and time. It includes device authentication along 
with credential transfer. Protocol uses one or more trusted 
Key Distribution Center (KDC) to generate domain 
parameter and other security material and important part is 
this KDC is not required to be online always. Initially KDC 
randomly selects particular elliptic curve over finite field GF 
(p) where p is a prime and makes base point P  with large 
order q (where q is also prime). KDC then picks random x ε 
GF(p) as a private key and publishes corresponding public 
key Q = x × P.   KDC generates random number Ki ε GF(p) 
as a private key for device i and generates corresponding 
public key Q i   =   Ki × P. The key pair {Q i   , Ki}   is given to 
device i. With the increasing number of devices, KDC can 
generate ECC key pair based on base point P for any number 
of devices as it is rich is terms of resources as compared to 
other devices in IoT. These ECC key pairs will be used to 
share common secret key for secure communication using 
ECCDH and is explained below. Steps of aforementioned 
ECCDH are shown presented in Fig. 1. Assumption is that 
ECC is running at trusted KDC. There is an agreement on 
system based point P and generate (Qu , Ku) and (Qh , Kh) 
pairs where  
Qu = Public key of Device 1 
Ku = Secret key of Device 1 
Qh = Public key of Device 2 
Kh = Secret key of Device 2 
And P is large prime number over GF (P) and 
generations of above keys are as follows: 
 
 
Fig. 1. ECCDH for Establishing Shared Secret Key 
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No parameter is disclosed in this process of establishing a 
shared secret key other than domain parameter P and public 
keys. This paper consider sensor node as device, because the 
functionalities and operational principle of wireless sensor 
networks makes it appropriate and mandatory candidate of 
the IoT.  
B. Protocol for Identity Establishment 
1) One way authentication: One way authentication 
authenticates Device 1 to Device 2 and is explained below. 
As per above ECCDH, both Device 1 and Device 2 has Xuh 
as a common secret key. Device 1 selects r ∈ GF (P) which 
will be used to create session key. Tu is generated as a time 
stamp  by Device 1. It is assumed that synchronisation is 
taken care using appropriate mechanism. Secret key is 
created by Device 1 as  L = h ( X uh   Tu ) . Then , Device 
1 encrypts r with secret key L as R = EL (r ) and encrypts Tu 
by Xuh as Tus = E Xuh (Tu). After this Device 1 builds a 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) value as MAC1 = 
MAC(Xuh , R || ICAP1)  where ICAP1 is a data structure 
representing an identity based capability for this Device 1 
giving access rigts. Details about ICAP are given in the 
same section below. Now Device 1 sends following 
parameters to Device 2 directly or through gateway node / 
coordination node or access point as  (R, Tus, MAC1). 
Device 2 generates it’s current time stamp as T current and 
Device 2 will decrypt Tus to get Tu and compare it with T 
current. If T current >Tu, it is valid. 
 
Fig. 2. One Way Authentication Protocol 
Now Device 2 calculates L and decrypt R to get r. Device 2 
also calculates the MAC1 ‘ and it will verify this with MAC1 
received from Device 1. If valid, then Device 1 is authentic 
to Device 2.  Device 1 also matches the ICAP1 received 
with ICAP2 stored at Device 2. If Device 2 gets match with 
R , MAC1 , Tus then Device 1 is authenticated to Device 2.  
Aforementioned protocol is presented in figure 2 given 
below. 
2) Mutual authentication: This part of authentication 
authenticates Device 2 to Device 1, and is explained below 
in figure 4. Device 2 builds a MAC as MAC2 = MAC (r || 
ICAP2) and also encrypts  r with Xuh as  R’ = E Xuh (r) .  
Device 2 sends (R’ , MAC2  ) to Device 1. Device 1 verifies 
MAC2 and  decrypt R’ and compare received r with this r ( 
denoted as r’ and r’’ in figure) . If match found , Device 2 is 
also authenticated to Device 1 and communication and 
access will be granted based on the ICAP2. This protocol 
achieves both mutual authentication along with capability 
based access control in secure way.  
 
Fig. 3. Protocol for Mutual Authentication 
3) Capability access for access control: Conceptually, a 
capability is a token that gives permission to access device. 
A capability is implemented as a data structure that contains 
two items of information:  a unique device identifier and 
access rights. For simplicity, it is sufficient to examine the 
case where a capability describes a set of access rights for 
the device. Device which may also contain security 
attributes such as access rights or other access control 
information. The ICAP (Identity based Capability) [11] was 
essentially extending the Capability system concept, in 
which the capability is used by any User or Subject that 
wants to get access to a certain device or Resource. 
 
Fig. 4. Capability structure 
If the capability that is presented by the Subject matches 
with the capability that is stored in the device or an entity 
that manages the device, access is granted. However, unlike 
the classical capability based system, ICAP introduced the 
identity of Subject or User in its operation. In this way, it 
claimed to reduce the number of capabilities stored in the 
so-called “Object Server” or “Gateway” or “Access Point” 
and thus offers more scalability. Moreover, it has better 
control in capability propagation which provides more 
efficient access later on. ICAP structure is shown in 4 with 
how capability is used for access control. ICAP is 
represented as  
ICAP = (ID, AR, Rnd ) 
Where:  
• ID: Device identifier  
• AR: Set of access rights for the device with device 
identifier as ID  
• Rnd: Random number to prevent forgery and is a result 
of one way hash function as: Rnd = f (ID, AR) 
In IECAC, access rights are sent in the form of MAC value 
in the authentication process.  
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IV. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS 
The evaluation will focus on identity establishment in 
terms of one way and mutual as the most important 
processes in the authentication. The Automated Validation 
of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) 
tool [12] based on Dolev-Yao model [13] is used for model 
and protocol verification. We implement aforementioned 
protocol in the stages. First stage of protocol authenticates 
Device 1 to Device 2 and i.e. one way authentication and 
second stage of protocol is for mutual authentication i.e. 
authenticates Device 2 to Device 1. Verification results are 
described below. 
A. Evaluation procedure 
In order to carry out the evaluation using AVISPA some 
assumptions are made. Both the devices have already 
obtained ECC based shared key using Diffie-Hellman 
(ECCDH). As stated earlier, assumption here is that KDC is 
secure and trusted. Complete protocol evaluation is 
presented in following model: 
D1 → D2:[R,Tus,MAC1];[{r}_L,{Tu}_Xuh,RND1] 
D1 ← D2:[R’,MAC2];[{r}_Xuh,RND2] 
Where: 
• D1: Device 1 
• D2: Device 2 
• { } _: A symbol of encryption 
• Tu :  Timestamp generated as a nonce 
• Xuh :  A shared key between D1 and D2 using ECCDH 
• r : Some value x ∈ GF(p) 
• RND1 : MAC value of Xuh, R and ICAP1 where ICAP 
is result of one way hash function f(Device_ID, 
Access Rights, Rnd), Rnd is random number 
generated to prevent forgery 
• RND2: MAC value of r and ICAP2 
• L : result of one way hash function (XOR of  Xuh and Tu) 
Besides this, Dolev-Yao intruder model has been 
introduced in the evaluation. The intruder is assumed to 
have the knowledge of the following: 
• ID: Device identifier 
• f () : Knowledge of one way hash function 
B. Evaluation results 
The goal of evaluation is to verify protocol for attacks 
mentioned above and ensures mutual authentication along 
with access control.  
1) Mutual authentication: Xuh is shared securely 
between D1 and D2 and r is provided by trusted KDC to 
both the devices. Consequently, D1 is authenticated to D2 as 
only D2 can decrypt R and Tus. Also MAC can be calculated 
only by D2 and D2 is sending encrypted r to authenticate it 
to D1. Verification results show that secure mutual 
authentication is achieved.  
2) Man in middle attack: In case of authentication, even 
there is man in middle attack on R, Tus, MAC1 parameters; 
attacker will not reveal any information. AVISPA shows 
that authentication protocol is free from attacks. For access 
control, man in the middle attacks happen when an attacker 
eavesdrop the ID and ICAP transmitted, and then 
masquerade attack happens when the attacker uses the stolen 
ID and CAP. The key to preventing masquerade attack from 
the stolen CAP is to use ID to validate the correct device. If 
the attacker manages to steal the ID, the attack is prevented 
by applying public key cryptography to ID, assuming that 
the authentication process has been done before access 
control. In this way, although the attacker gets the ICAP 
which is not encrypted, the capability validity check will 
return an exception because the one way hash function, f( 
ID, AR, Rnd) will return a different result than the one 
presented in the CAP, without a correct ID. 
Another type of man-in-middle attack is replay attack. 
Adversary can intercept the message sent out from D1. 
However, it is not possible in IECAC because it can easily 
detect by verifying timestamp Tu. If Tu is older than 
predefined threshold value, it is invalid and has been used. If 
Tu is changed, MAC1 = MAC(Xuh, R || ICAP1) is not valid 
and consistent. For access control, IECAC prevents the 
replay attack by maintaining the freshness of Rnd, for 
example by using time stamp or nonce by including MAC as 
well. Even if the attacker manages to compromise the 
solution and gets the ICAP, it cannot use the same capability 
next time because the validity will be expired. 
3) DoS attack: Upon receiving the message from D1, 
D2 first checks the validity of timestamp. If it is not valid, 
then D2 discards the message. Otherwise, it computes a 
MAC2 value to compare with received value. DoS happens 
when an attacker accesses a particular resource massively 
and simultaneously by using the same or different IDs. It is 
easy to control  access using one ID because the system is 
able to maintain the session, thus the access of the same ID 
to the same resource can be restricted to only one session at 
a time. The potential of DoS attacks from multiple IDs can 
be prevented in the capability propagation process. 
Therefore, DoS attack can be prevented or at least 
minimized. 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
Security level of protocol presented in this paper 
depends on the type of MAC algorithm, encryption 
algorithm and security level of ECC signature. We propose 
to use RC5 stream cipher for encryption, which takes 0.26 
ms on Mica2 motes [14, 15 and 16]. RC5 is notable for its 
simplicity for resource constrained devices such as IoT and 
its flexibility due to the built in variability. Heavy use of 
data independent rotations and mixture of different 
operations provides strong security to RC5 [17].  
We propose to use SHA-1 as one way hash function 
which takes 3.63 ms on Mica2 motes and it is 
computationally expensive to find text which matches given 
hash and also it is difficult to two different texts which 
produces the same hash [14, 15, and 16]. To generate the 
MAC value, we propose CBC-MAC which has advantage of 
small key size and small number of block cipher invocations 
and takes 3.12 ms on Mica2 motes [15].The time required to 
generate random number is 0.44 ms and ECC to perform 
point multiplication which takes 800 ms on Mica2 motes 
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[15,16]. In IECAC protocol as the message length is fixed, 
CBC-MAC is most secure [18]. It is clear from these values 
that maximum time is required for ECC point 
multiplication. In IECAC, point multiplication is taking 
place at KDC and as KDC is powerful device, 
computational overhead is trivial as compared to the 
sensors. We denote the computational time required for each 
operation by device in IoT by following notation:  
D H = Time to perform one way hash function SHA-1 
D MAC = Time to generate Mac value by CBC-MAC 
D RC5 = Time to perform encryption and decryption by RC5 
D MUL = Time to perform ECC point multiplication 
R = Time for random number generation  
TABLE 2. COMPUTATIONAL TIME FOR IECAC 
Scheme IECAC HBQ [19] IoT_Auth [5] 
Auth. 
Time 
2DH + 2DMAC+ 
2DRC5 
2DH + 2DMAC +    
DRC5+ 3 DMUL 
R + DH  + 2DMUL 
Total 
2DH + 2DMAC+ 
2DRC5 
2DH + 2DMAC +    
DRC5+ 3 DMUL 
R + DH  + 2DMUL 
Total 
time 
14.02 ms 2413.76ms 1604.07ms 
Table 2 shows the comparison of computational time for 
above-mentioned protocol. IECAC protocol for mutual 
authentication and access control for the IoT devices takes 
less time (14.28 ms) as compared to other protocol 
compared in this paper. Key point to note here is that, none 
of the work has addressed issue of authentication and access 
control as an integrated solution for IoT.  Total 
computational time for of the proposed scheme, HBQ [19] 
and mutual authentication for IoT (IoT_Auth) [5] is shown 
in table 2. IoT_Auth scheme requires R + DH  + 2DMUL time 
for mutual authentication which comes approximately 
1604.07 ms. HBQ scheme takes 2DH  + 2DMAC  +D RC5 + 
3DMUL     total time for authentication which is approximately 
2,413.76 ms . Key point to note here is that both the schemes 
do not address access control after authentication. IECAC 
takes only DH  + 2DMAC +2DRC5 which takes only 14.02 ms 
which is much better than other two schemes analyzed in 
this paper. In IECAC, 2DH factor is introduced which 
comprises time required by one way hash function in 
authentication as well as in ICAP to calculate Rnd.   
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Distributed, lightweight and attack resistant solutions, 
being the most favorable choices for IoT , puts resilient 
challenges for authentication and access control of devices. 
Paper presented efficient and scalable ECC based 
authentication and access control protocol. Protocol is 
divided in two phases as one way authentication and mutual 
authentication and integrated with capability based access 
control solution. Power of ECC is extended to achieve 
mutual authentication of devices with novel capability based 
approach for access control.  
Furthermore, paper presents comparative analysis of 
different authentication and access control schemes for IoT. 
Comparison in terms of computational time shows that 
IECAC scheme is efficient as compared to other solution. 
Protocol is also analyzed for the performance and security 
point of view for different possible attacks in IoT scenario. 
Protocol evaluation shows that it can defy attacks like DoS, 
man-in-middle and replay attacks efficiently and effectively. 
Paper also presents protocol verification using AVISPA tool 
which proves that the IECAC protocol is also efficient for 
large scale devices in terms of key sharing and 
authentication. Future plan is to put this protocol in place 
with RFID middleware architecture for Identity 
management in IoT.  
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